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IRS USE OF THE CIVIL SUMMONS POWER:
THE INSTITUTIONAL GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT-
UNITED STATES v. LASALLE NATIONAL BANK
Evidence obtained against a taxpayer during the course of a civil tax inves-
tigation may be used in a subsequent criminal tax proceeding.' As a result,
there has been considerable controversy 2 over the extent of the Internal
Revenue Service's authority to gather information through the use of a civil
summons.3 A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court, United
States v. LaSalle National Bank, 4 has increased the power of the IRS to
obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution of a taxpayer by a civil summons.
Particular safeguards 5 that are applicable to criminal proceedings 6 do not
apply to a civil summons proceeding. Consequently, this decision represents
a further infringement of the protections afforded to a taxpayer who may be
the subject of a criminal tax prosecution.
This Note will discuss the LaSalle requirements for issuance of a civil
summons from the perspective of the internal procedures followed by the
Internal Revenue Service. It also will examine the statutory civil summons
power of the IRS and the judicial evolution of standards applicable to its use.
The Note will then explore the problems inherent in a liberal approach to
the use of the civil summons. Finally, it will discuss the role of the courts in
enforcing these judicially created standards and the problems which may be
encountered under the new standards enunciated in LaSalle.
1. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207 (5th
Cir. 1968); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956).
2. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (a summons directing the
taxpayers' attorneys to produce documents obtained from their accountants relating to the prep-
aration of their tax returns did not violate the taxpayers' Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination since that privilege is a personal privilege and protects only testimonial utter-
ances); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (a taxpayer had no protectable interest
in the records of his former employer, and a summons is enforceable if issued in good faith and
prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48
(1964) (the IRS was not required to show probable cause to suspect fraud in order to obtain a
taxpayer's records for which the three-year statute of limitations had run unless the taxpayer
raised a substantial question that judicial enforcement of the summons would be an abuse of the
court's process); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) (taxpayers may not bring a suit in
equity to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of a summons since they
have an adequate remedy at law-the judicial proceeding necessary to enforce the summons).
3. Authority to issue an administrative summons is conferred upon the Internal Revenue
Service by I.R.C. § 7602. See note 15 infra.
4. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
5. The safeguards are both constitutional and statutory. See notes 89-96 and accompanying
text infra.
6. For a discussion of the contrast in the constitutional rights of the person charged with
tax fraud and those of the average criminal defendant, see Hewitt, The Constitutional Rights of
the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44 TAxEs 660 (1966).
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AUTHORITY TO ISSUE CIVIL SUMMONS
The Internal Revenue Service was the first federal administrative agency
authorized to use investigative subpoena powers. 7 It uses its civil summons
power to obtain financial records of taxpayers, including bank records," ac-
countants' records, 9 records of tax return preparers, 10 and employment rec-
ords.11 The civil summons is also used to compel individuals to appear and
testify. 12
Legislative authorization for the IRS to issue civil summonses has re-
mained substantially unchanged since codification of the 1939 Internal Rev-
enue Code, 13 when broad powers of investigation were customarily con-
ferred by statute. 14 Currently, section 760215 of the Code authorizes the
issuance of summonses, while sections 7402(b) and 7604(a) provide for their
judicial enforcement.
7. The Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 226-27, was the first legislative authori-
zation to the IRS to issue summonses and to obtain judicial enforcement of those summonses.
See Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials: A Study of Due Process Requirements in Administrative
Investigations (pt. 1), 47 MINN. L. REv. 939, 964-65 (1963).
8. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
9. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (enforcing summons directing accountant to
produce client's business records that had been given to him for preparation of client's tax
returns).
10. United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1973) (enforcing summons requiring tax
return preparer to produce names, addresses, and social security numbers of clients for whom he
had prepared returns).
11. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (enforcing summons to taxpayer's
former employer requesting production of records of taxpayer's employment and compensation).
12. I.R.C. § 7602(2).
13. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 310, & 310 n.13 (1978). See Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, §§ 3614, 3615, 3654, 53 Stat. 438-40, 446.
14. See 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.03 (1958 & Supp. 1970), and note
16 infra.
15. I.R.C. § 7602. The section reads:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or any other data which may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or
care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person
liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may
deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the
summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give
such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry.
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There is no statutory provision expressly prohibiting the issuance of a civil
summons in aid of an investigation of criminal tax liability. 16  Those limita-
tions that are recognized have arisen as a result of judicial interpretations.
Since the IRS has no power to enforce its own summonses, the courts tradi-
tionally have played a key role in determining the extent of the information
that the IRS could obtain through the exercise of its civil summons power.
LIMITATIONS ON THE SUMMONS POWER
The first case in which the Supreme Court discussed the limitations on
the use of the summons power was Reisman v. Caplin.17  This case held
that taxpayers could not obtain declaratory and injunctive relief from en-
forcement of a summons, since they had an adequate remedy at law."' The
Court characterized an enforcement action as "an adversary proceeding" 19 in
which challenges to a summons could be judicially determined. In discussing
the availability of a judicial forum where challenges to an IRS summons
could be resolved, the Court, in dicta, stated that in an enforcement pro-
ceeding "[t]he witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate
ground. This would include . . .the defenses that the material is sought for
the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecu-
tion ... "20
The Supreme Court again discussed the adversary nature of a summons
enforcement proceeding in United States v. Powell.2 1 In Powell, the Court
16. The dissenting justices in LaSalle, which was decided by a 5-4 majority, argue that since
there is no express prohibition on the use of a civil summons to aid in a criminal investigation,
an internal revenue summons should be enforceable if issued prior to a recommendation for
criminal prosecution. 437 U.S. at 320. This argument overlooks the significance of the historical
development of investigative powers of administrative agencies.
Courts prior to the 1940's were very hostile to the use of subpoenas to inquire into citizens'
private affairs. See, e.g., Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (an SEC subpoena was unenforceable
where there was no probable cause established); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298
(1924) (an FTC subpoena was unenforceable because it failed to show probable cause and to
state its demands in specific terms); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (a Congres-
sional subpoena was unenforceable because Congress had no power to inquire into the private
affairs of citizens). See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 3.01 (1958 & Supp.
1970). Consequently, Congress began to confer broad grants of investigatory powers to these
agencies to counteract the effect of the narrow judicial interpretations of the statutes, id. at
§ 3.03, with the intention that the agencies would thereby be able to exercise at least the
powers expressly spelled out in the grants. Since the statutory provisions granting the IRS the
power to use the civil summons date back to 1939, they should today be read to authorize only
those uses specifically granted by Congress. See 437 U.S. at 316-17 n.18 and note 13 supra.
17. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
18. Id. at 445-50. For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Reisman, see
Bender, The Implications of Reisman v. Caplin in Fraud Cases, 23 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAXA-
TION 1293 (1965).
19. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1964).
20. Id. at 449. The second defense suggested by the Court was that the material was pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. But see note 93 and accompanying text infra.
21. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). For a general discussion of the Powell decision, see Note, Proof
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delineated standards which the IRS must satisfy in order to obtain enforce-
ment of a summons. These standards are that: (1) the investigation is being
conducted for a legitimate purpose; (2) the inquiry is relevant to that pur-
pose; (3) the IRS does not already possess the information sought; and (4) the
administrative steps set out in the Internal Revenue Code have been fol-
lowed. 2 2  Once the IRS has made this showing, the burden shifts to the
taxpayer to show that enforcing the summons would result in an abuse of the
court's process. This abuse would be found when a summons had been is-
sued for an improper purpose, such as "to harass the taxpayer or to put
pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose re-
flecting on the good faith of the particular investigation." 
2 3
Several years later, in Donaldson v. United States,24 a taxpayer challenged
an IRS summons on the ground that it could not be used to aid an investiga-
tion which potentially could result in a recommendation that he be crimi-
nally prosecutedY. 5  The taxpayer based his argument on the dictum in
Reisman.26  The Donaldson Court analyzed the Reisman dictum and deter-
mined that it was only applicable to situations in which a criminal charge is
pending or to an investigation "solely for criminal purposes." 27 After exam-
ining the statutory authority for use of civil summonses, the Court concluded
that their use in investigating potentially criminal conduct was clearly au-
thorized. 28  It then held 29 that an internal revenue summons was enforce-
able if it was "issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for crimi-
nal prosecution." 3
0
Required to Open a "Closed Year"-United States v. Powell, 6 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv.
922 (1965); Comment, Commissioner May Examine Taxpayer's Records for Years Barred by
Statute of Limitations Without Proving Reasonable Suspicion of Fraud-United States v. Powell,
63 MICH. L. REV. 939 (1965); Note, Enforcement of Subpoena Duces Tecum for Years
Barred by Statute of Limitations, 38 TEMP. L. Q. 462 (1965); 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 397 (1965).
22. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964). Enforcement has been denied when
these criteria were not met. See, e.g., United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621
(10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 413 F.Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975) (enforcement denied on failure to show
relevancy); United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973) (enforcement denied when
the IRS failed to show the relevancy of information demanded and failed to show it was not
already in possession of the requested material).
23. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
24. 400 U.S. 517 (1971). The case involved a taxpayer's attempt to intervene in a proceeding
to enforce summonses issued to his former employer to obtain records of his employment and
compensation during the years that were being investigated.
25. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 532 (1971).
26. See text accompanying note 20.
27. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 533 (1971).
28. Id. at 535.
29. The holding with respect to the use of the summons was an alternate holding, since the
main issue in the case was decided on the question of the taxpayer's standing to intervene in
the enforcement proceeding. It was determined that he had no "proprietary interest" in the
records of his former employer and therefore no protectable interest that would grant him the
right to intervene. Id. at 530-31.
30. Id. at 536. For a discussion of the good faith requirement in Donaldson, see Note,
[Vol. 28:469
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This, however, did not resolve the problem. In United States v. LaSalle
National Bank ' it became necessary to take the Donaldson rationale one
step further. The Court in LaSalle was required to determine the limitations
applicable to the use of a civil summons where the sole purpose of the agent
conducting the investigation was to gather evidence of criminal tax liability.
THE LASALLE DECISION
Development of the Case
The LaSalle case began when an IRS special agent 32 was assigned 33 to
investigate the tax liability of a Chicago taxpayer. 34 The nature of the as-
signment was "to investigate the possibility of any criminal violations of the
Internal Revenue Code." 35  The tax returns of the taxpayer had disclosed
rental income from real estate which was held in Illinois land trusts3 6 by
the LaSalle National Bank as trustee. 37 In order to determine the accuracy
of the taxpayer's returns, the agent issued two summonses under the author-
ity of section 7602 seeking production of the bank's files on those trusts and
all other related documents in its possession. 38 On the advice of counsel,
the bank refused to produce the requested material.
The government then filed a petition in the district court for enforcement
of the summonses. 39 After hearing testimony 40 and examining the IRS case
Taxpayer Intervention at Summary Proceedings to Enforce an Internal Revenue Summons, 32
MD. L. REV. 143, 150-55 (1972).
31. 437 U.S. 298 (1978). The Court states that LaSalle is intended as a supplement to the
decision in Donaldson. Id. at 299.
32. A special agent is a member of the Intelligence Division of the IRS, whose primary
responsibility is the investigation of criminal tax liability, 26 C.FR. § 601.107(a) (1978). Tax
investigations are also conducted by revenue agents, who are members of the Audit Division of
the Service and are primarily responsible for civil investigations, 26 C.F.R. § 601.105(b) (1978).
Although the Intelligence Division and the Audit Division have been redesignated as the Crim-
inal Enforcement Division and the Examination Division, this Note will refer to them by their
former designations. See IRS News Release, February 6, 1978.
33. Special Agent Olivero had requested the assignment after receiving information from a
confidential informant and from an unrelated investigation. 437 U.S. at 300,
34. Olivero received the assignment in 1975 to investigate the taxable years 1970-1972 of
the taxpayer, John Gattuso. Id.
35. Id.
36. An Illinois land trust is a form of ownership of property in which the trustee holds both
legal and equitable title to real property. The beneficiary's interest is solely an interest in
personal property, although the beneficiary is entitled to all the benefits and enjoyment of the
real estate. Id. at 301 n.2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, § 8.31 (1977).
37. This fact was revealed by land trust files collected by the IRS from banks. 437 U.S. at
301.
38. The summons specifically requested "all deeds, options, correspondence, closing state-
ments, and seller statements, escrows, and tax bills pertaining to all property" held in the trusts
in question. 437 U.S. at 302.
39. This procedure is authorized by I.R.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a).
40. The testimony included Olivero's admission that the nature of the assignment was to
investigate the possibility of criminal tax liability of Gattuso, 437 U.S. at 300, and testimony by
a member of the law firm representing Gattuso and the bank that Olivero had told him that the
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file, the court determined that the special agent had focused his investiga-
tion on the possible criminal activities of the taxpayer and was conducting
his investigation for the sole purpose of "unearthing evidence of criminal
conduct" by the taxpayer. 4 1 It concluded that the use of the summons was
improper under such circumstances, 42 and accordingly denied enforcement.
Upon appeal by the government, the Seventh Circuit characterized the
court's determination that the agent was conducting a solely criminal investi-
gation as a finding of fact 43 and limited its review to an inquiry into whether
the proper legal test had been applied. After examining the ways in which
the other circuits 44 had interpreted the Donaldson standard, the court of
appeals concluded that use of an internal revenue summons solely for crim-
inal purposes was "a quintessential example of bad faith." 45  It then af-
firmed the decision of the district court. 46
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court accepted the lower court's determination that the in-
vestigation was conducted solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence of
criminal conduct. It concluded that Donaldson was not controlling in such a
fact situation. 47  Rather, the Court stated that the issue before it was
investigation "was strictly related to criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at
303.
41. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9407, at 84,073; 37
A.F.T.R.2d 76-582, at 76-1240 (N.D. I11. 1976).
42. The Court relied on Reisman and Donaldson to conclude that a summons issued before
a recommendation for prosecution has been made is not issued in good faith and is unenforce-
able if the "focus and determination" of the IRS is on "criminal prosecution as the end and goal
of its investigation." 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19407, at 84,072; 37 A.F.T.R.2d $ 76-582, at 76-1240.
43. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302, 305 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S.
298 (1978).
44. See United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir. 1976) (a summons may be
enforced if (1) the Intelligence Division of the IRS has not yet recommended prosecution, (2)
the agent has not already formed a firm purpose to recommend prosecution, (3) the summons is
not intended to harass the taxpayer, and (4) the IRS has not already inspected the material
requested in the summons); United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975) (a
summons used solely for criminal prosecution was not in good faith and therefore unenforceable
even though issued prior to a recommendation for prosecution); United States v. Weingarden,
473 F.2d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 1973) ("the standard is whether the sole purpose of the issuance of
the summons is for criminal prosecution"); United States v. Wall Co., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (an issuance of a summons would presumably be in bad faith if the investigatory
agent had already decided to recommend criminal prosecution, even though no formal recom-
mendation had been made).
45. 554 F.2d at 309.
46. Id.
47. 437 U.S. at 307. The LaSalle fact situation was distinguished from the Donaldson situa-
tion. In Donaldson, there was only a possibility that the investigation which the summons had
been issued to aid could result in criminal prosecution of the taxpayer. In contrast, in LaSalle
the taxpayer was being investigated for the sole purpose of discovering evidence of criminal
conduct. Id.
[Vol. 28:469
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whether a finding that a summons was issued for a solely criminal purpose
led inevitably to the conclusion that such a summons was not issued "in
good-faith pursuit of congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602." 48
In order to resolve the issue, the LaSalle Court adopted the approach
followed in Donaldson.4 9  It first analyzed the statutory enforcement system
to ascertain the intent of Congress, giving special consideration to the inter-
related nature of the civil and criminal penalties for tax fraud, 50 and con-
cluded that the absence of statutory distinction between the civil and crimi-
nal aspects of a tax fraud investigation must be reflected in any limitation
placed on the good faith use of an internal revenue summons. 5 1 The inter-
nal organization of the Internal Revenue Service was also examined by the
Court in an attempt to determine the importance of the special agent's
role 52 in a tax fraud investigation. Finally, the Court explored the policy
reasons5 3 for limiting the use of a civil summons in obtaining evidence for
criminal prosecutions.
After considering these factors, the Court held that certain requirements
must be met for a summons to be enforceable. First, the summons must be
issued 54 prior to an IRS recommendation of criminal prosecution to the De-
partment of Justice. This holding settled a dispute over whether a recom-
mendation for criminal prosecution takes place at the time the IRS recom-
mends criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice, or whether the
key recommendation occurs at some level within the IRS. 55 Second, the
48. Id. at 308. The Court contended that its responsibility in LaSalle was "to examine the
limits of the good-faith use of an Internal Revenue summons issued under § 7602." Id. at 307.
49. The Donaldson Court began its analysis by reviewing the statutory structure provided
by Congress for the issuance and enforcement of IRS summonses, Donaldson v. United States,
400 U.S. 517, 523-25 (1971), adopting the review of this structure outlined in Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1964). The Court also examined the internal organization of the IRS.
400 U.S. 517, 534-35.
50. 437 U.S. at 308. A taxpayer who wilfully files a false or fraudulent tax return is subject
to criminal penalties under I.R.C. §§ 7206 and 7207, and to a civil penalty in the amount of
50% of the underpayment of the tax, under I.R.C. § 6653(b).
51. 437 U.S. at 311.
52. The layers of review through which an agent's recommendation for criminal prosecution
must pass were considered significant by the Court, Id. at 314-16. But see notes 70-87 and
accompanying text infra for a criticism of this position.
53. The Court advanced the following policy reasons for imposing a "prophylactic restraint"
on the use of the summons power after criminal prosecution has been recommended: (1) the
possibility of broadening the Justice Department's right to discovery in criminal litigation; and
(2) the possible infringement of the "role of the grand jury as the principal tool of criminal
accusation." Id. at 312.
54. Significantly, a summons issued prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution may
be enforced after this recommendation is made. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 101 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, Inc., 311 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 902 (1963). See Comment, Use of the Summons, Intervention and Con-
stitutional Rights, 2 HOFSTan L. REV. 135, 149-50 (1974).
55. Compare United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977) (hold-
ing that the recommendation to the Department of Justice is the operative recommendation);
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civil summons must be used in the good faith pursuit of the congressionally
authorized purposes of section 7602,56 a concept encompassing two separate re-
quirements. Not only were the good faith standards established in Powell57
to be satisfied, but the IRS "in an institutional sense" could not be
shown to have abandoned pursuit of a civil tax liability of the taxpayer. 58 The
Court further stated that the personal motivation of the special agent in-
volved was not dispositive of the issue of good faith, 59 and that the burden of
proof was on the taxpayer to prove absence of any civil purpose for the
summons. It then reversed the decision of the Seventh Circuit and re-
manded the case to the district court 60 for a determination of whether there
had been a total absence of civil purpose for the summons.
The Court's enunciation of a standard of institutional good faith on the part
of the IRS was an unexpected 6 1 interpretation of the good faith require-
ment established in the earlier decisions. 62 The courts of appeal had been
split in their interpretations of the good faith standard. Some had maintained
that the subjective good faith of the individual agent conducting the investi-
gation was necessary, 63 while others held that an objective test for good faith
was met whenever a summons was issued prior to a recommendation for
and United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 1972) (also finding the recom-
mendation to Justice operative), with United States v. Latko, 520 F.2d 622, 625 (3d Cir. 1975)
(suggesting that a recommendation within the IRS might be sufficient).
56. 437 U.S. at 318.
57. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
58. 437 U.S. at 318.
59. The Court's reasoning in reaching this conclusion parallels the reasoning in Donaldson.
The Donaldson Court refused to draw the line between permissible civil and impermissible
criminal purposes for use of a summons at the point of the special agent's entry into an investi-
gation, because to do so would "stultify enforcement of federal law." 400 U.S. 51.7, 535-36.
Similarly, the LaSalle Court refused to draw that line on the basis of a special agent's personal
intent, because to do so would "unnecessarily frustrate the enforcement of the tax laws." 437
U.S. at 316.
60. Id. at 319.
61. 437 U.S. at 319 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Prior to this opinion, the requirement of good
faith had been read by the lower courts as referring only to the good faith of the special agent
conducting the investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir.
1976); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Wall
Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972). No other court has ever suggested or applied a
standard of "institutional" good faith.
62. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971) (requiring a summons to be issued
in good faith and before a recommendation for criminal prosecution); United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964) (stating that a summons was issued for an improper purpose if the
"particular investigation" was not in good faith); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964)
(stating that a summons could be challenged if issued for an improper purpose, such as for use
in a criminal prosecution). These cases did not define "good faith" nor did they specify that the
good faith of the particular agent was required. However, they also (lid not indicate that good
faith was only required of the IRS "in an institutional posture."
63. See United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Latko,
520 F.2d 622, 625 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 374-75 (3d Cir.
1975); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 1973).
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criminal prosecution. 64  The one-step objective test was endorsed by the
government and the dissenting justices in LaSalle. 65 The new standard,
requiring institutional good faith from the IRS, represents a compromise be-
tween the subjective good faith standard and the one-step objective test. As
is often the result when such a compromise is reached, this new standard
may prove to be both unrealistic and unworkable.
66
VALIDITY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL GOOD FAITH STANDARD
The concept of institutional good faith established in LaSalle presents cer-
tain problems as it relates to the internal procedures followed by the IRS.
Good faith has been defined as "[a]n honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts
which render [the] transaction unconscientious." 6 7  Its existence can be as-
certained by examining the subjective intent of a party688 or by using objec-
tive standards.6 9 The LaSalle court's compromise standard, the institutional
good faith standard, is neither a strictly subjective test, based on the motiva-
tion of the individual agent issuing the summons, nor a completely objective
standard, considering only the time of issuance of the summons. Examina-
tion of this standard from the perspective of the internal procedures of the
IRS demonstrates its questionable validity.
Internal responsibility for the investigation of all alleged violations of the
Internal Revenue Code rests with the Intelligence Division of the IRS. 70
64. This position had been accepted by a number of the lower courts. S~e United States v.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Hodge and
Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1209
(10th Cir. 1972); United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir. 1971).
65. 437 U.S. at 320-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. 437 U.S. at 321 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 822 (4th ed. 1968).
68. See, e.g., Nora Springs Co-op Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa Sup. Ct.
1976) (good faith under Uniform Commercial Code refers to honesty in fact); Farmer's Co-op.
Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1975) (test of good faith
under U.C.C. is wholly subjective test of honesty); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1973) (good faith
test under U.C.C. requires honesty of intent). See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Rundle, 368 F.Supp. 1186, 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (good faith
required of prison warden under Civil Rights Act of 1871 constituted reasonable reliance on
existing procedures rather than subjective absence of malice or ill will); Meyer v. State of New
York, 344 F.Supp. 1377, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (good faith required by statute allowing appeals
in forma pauperis was judged by objective standards). See notes 64-65 and accompanying text
supra.
70. 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(a) (1978); [1979] 5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AD. (CCH)
1 9122.1. (The Internal Revenue Manual is the official policy manual of the IRS, which is re-
printed by Commerce Clearing House.) For an overview of the operating procedures of the
Intelligence Division, see Carles, Special Agent's Manual Gives Insight into IRS Procedures for
Tax Fraud Audit, 43 J. TAx. 290 (1975); Walters, IRS Intelligence Division Operating Proce-
dures: From 1040 Through Criminal Trial, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1195 (1974).
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Special agents carry out the actual investigations 71 and institutional policy is
to leave experienced agents largely unsupervised when conducting investiga-
tions. 72  The agents have the authority to issue civil summonses on their
own initiative, 73 with no review of the agent's actions or the appropriateness
of issuing a summons being made at the time the summons is served. 74
If the subpoenaed party does not comply within six working clays, en-
forcement action will be undertaken. 75 It is at this point that the first re-
view of the agent's conduct takes place. A description of the investigation
and a recommendation must be given to the head of the Intelligence Divi-
sion 76 before enforcement proceedings are undertaken. 77 If the request for
enforcement is approved, the report is then sent on to the regional counsel
for his approval. 78
The significant lack of supervision prior to issuance of a summons is made
possible for two reasons: (1) the express goal of the IRS is to achieve "the
highest possible degree of voluntary compliance with the internal revenue
laws"; 79 and (2) a common practice of many IRS agents is to use the sum-
mons power as a threat to coerce voluntary compliance.8 0 If a taxpayer
complies voluntarily with an agent's request, no review of the agent's con-
duct will ever take place. The agent is the only representative of the IRS the
taxpayer will ever encounter. Consequently, the good faith of the agent 8 is
of more practical concern to the taxpayer than the "motivation" of the in-
stitution, which at this point in the process is only aware of the taxpayer
through the agent.
The internal policies of the IRS tend to cast doubt on whether it does in
fact exercise good faith as a matter of policy. The LaSalle Court contended
that only in an extraordinary situation would an IRS investigation be solely
criminal, as opposed to being interrelated 82 in nature. 83  It stated that a
71. 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(a) (1978).
72. [1979] 5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AD. (CCH) 9162(2).
73. Commissioner's Del. Order No. 4 (rev. 6), 1978-46 I.R.B. 15, 769 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) 6298; T.D. 7297, 1974-1 C.B. 364, 749 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6303.
74. After an agent has served a summons, the original of the summons is placed in the
administrative file of the division issuing the summons. [1979] 5 INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL-AD. (CCH) 9367.
75. Id. at 936(10).2(4).
76. Id. at 936(10).4(1),(2).
77. Special Agent Olivero, however, testified in LaSalle that he had made no report about
the case to his superiors at the time the enforcement petition was filed against the LaSalle
National Bank, 437 U.S. at 302. Therefore, it is evident that agents do not always comply with
even these minimal review procedures.
78. [1979] 5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AD. (CCH) 936(10).4(2).
79. 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(a) (1978).
80. [1979] 5 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AD. (CCH) 9362.4.
81. The Court conceded that the motivation of the individual special agent may have to be
examined in evaluating the good faith requirements of Powell (see notes 21-23 and accompany-
ing text supra), 437 U.S. at 316, n.17.
82. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
83. 437 U.S. at 314.
[Vol. 28:469
19791 UNITED STATES V. LASALLE NATIONAL BANK 479
single agent's attempt to build a criminal case does not necessarily negate
the institutional responsibility to determine and collect civil tax liabilities. 8
4
According to the IRS's own policies, however, all civil action with respect
to a taxpayer must be frozen while a criminal investigation is in progress, 85
unless it is determined that the civil action will not jeopardize "the success-
ful criminal prosecution of the taxpayer." 86 This represents a policy deci-
sion to give priority to successful criminal prosecutions. It also suggests that
institutional policy is to manipulate the relevant procedures in such a man-
ner as to have them comply with the letter of the law while violating the
spirit. If civil actions were not frozen during criminal investigations, the IRS
could proceed to a final settlement of civil liability, thus precluding further
use of the civil summons.8 7 However, if civil action is suspended, the
summons can be used freely to aid criminal investigations, since pursuit of
civil tax liability has not yet been abandoned. Such a policy is indicative of a
lack of institutional good faith.
IMPACT OF LASALLE
The Supreme Court's decision in LaSalle has expanded the scope of the
IRS's power to obtain, through a civil summons, evidence that may be used
against a taxpayer in a criminal tax prosecution. This decision will limit the
ability of the courts to fulfill their traditional function of safeguarding the
interests of the taxpayer in summons enforcement proceedings, 88 since one
effective check on the summons power, the requirement of good faith, has
been narrowly interpreted. The expanded power of the IRS will aggravate
some of the problems which already exist in this area and will probably
create new ones.
One of the major existing problems in allowing the liberal use of the ad-
ministrative summons power is the restricted scope of many constitutional
and statutory protections available to a defendant in the context of an ad-
ministrative summons proceeding.8 9 For example, the Fourth Amendment
requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable has been found to be
satisfied when the administrative summons was not indefinite and was shown
84. Id.
85. [1979] 2 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT (CCH) 4565.41.
86. id.
87. See United States v. Tosie, 336 F.Supp. 1051, 1052 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (denying enforce-
ment of a summons where the taxpayer had previously settled the fact of and the amount of its
civil liability because no proper purpose for the summons existed.)
88. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U.S. 440, 446 (1964).
89. See Hewitt, Constitutional Rights of the Taxpayer in a Fraud Investigation, 44 TAXES
660 (1966); Hunke, The Lawyer's Role in a Criminal Tax Evasion or Fraud Case Prior to
Indictment, 46 N. DAK. L. REV. 9 (1969); Johnston, Present Status of Taxpayer's Rights and
Privileges with Respect to Self-Incrimination, Searches and Seizures, and Privileged Communi-
cations, 26 S. CALIF. TAX INST. 1017 (1974).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:469
to be relevant to the investigation being conducted. 90 Also, the Fifth
Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination has been lim-
ited to testimonial utterances9 1 and does not apply to corporations. 92  The
attorney-client privilege was held to apply only to information communicated
to an attorney in professional confidence, 9 3 and accountant-client privileges
provided by state law have not been recognized in internal revenue proceed-
ings. 94  The work-product privilege also has afforded little protection. In
fact, it has been seriously questioned whether that privilege has any rele-
90. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (FTC did not
exceed its investigatory power by ordering salt companies to file reports showing continued
compliance with a cease and desist order because the inquiry was within the authority of the
agency, not indefinite, and reasonably relevant); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 209 (1946) (subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Department of Labor ordering
corporations to produce specified records to determine existence of violations of Fair Labor
Standards Act were relevant to authorized purposes of the inquiry); United States v. Carter, 489
F.2d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1973) (summons to tax preparer requesting names, addresses, and social
security numbers of clients was relevant and material); United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d
564, 566 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970) (summons requiring production of
corporate records relating to operation of corporation was not overly broad); United States v.
Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921
(1968) (summonses issued to bank requesting records of transactions of four customers were not
overly indefinite).
91. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (documents in the hands of the tax-
payers' attorney were not protected by taxpayers' Fifth Amendment privilege because produc-
tion of documents, however incriminating, involves no testimonial self-incrimination). For a
general discussion of the Fifth Amendment's application to private papers, see Note, Private
Papers Now Subject to Reasonable Search and Seizure, 26 DEPAuL L. REV. 848, 850-61
(1977).
92. E.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205-08 (1946) (Fifth
Amendment did not protect a corporation or its officers from producing corporate records and
papers in response to an administrative subpoena or order); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 700-01 (1944) (Fifth Amendment applies only to natural persons); United States v. Scor-
novacco's Restaurant, Inc., 528 F.2d 19, 24 (7th Cir. 1975) (Fifth Amendment privilege was not
available to a sole proprietorship that was validly incorporated under state law and was holding
itself out as a corporation); United States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 569 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970) (order to produce corporate books and records did not violate
individual's privilege against self-incrimination). See Lipton & Petrie, Constitutional Safeguards
and Corporate Records, 23 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx. 1315, 1325-30 (1965).
93. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974) (attorney's records
relating to receipt of fees were not privileged); United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1040
(7th Cir. 1973) (three-page memorandum prepared by attorney summarizing notes and legal
judgments made at a meeting was not protected by attorney-client privilege); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (summons requiring
attorney to answer questions on date and general nature of legal services performed and on
nature of documents retained, and requiring production of retained income tax returns, did not
violate the attorney-client privilege). For further discussion of the attorney-client privilege in
the IRS summons setting, see Comment, Use of the Summons, Intervention and Constitutional
Rights, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 135, 185-225 (1974).
94. E.g., United States v. Bowman, 358 F.2d 421, 422-23 (3d Cir. 1965); Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); United States v.
Tsukuno, 341 F.Supp. 839, 840-41 (N.D. II. 1972); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278 F.Supp.
525, 530-31 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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vancy in an IRS enforcement proceeding. 95 Where its relevancy has been
recognized, the burden of proof placed on the government to overcome this
protection has been light.96 If the IRS is given the power to use the sum-
mons more liberally, an expanded group of taxpayers probably will be sub-
jected to administrative summons proceedings. Accordingly, the impact of
these restrictions on the taxpayer's constitutional and statutory protections
will become proportionally more serious.
Another important problem in this area is that only limited discovery is
available to a taxpayer contesting an internal revenue summons. Although
the taxpayer has the right to use the discovery tools available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 that right has been restricted 98 by the
courts. Concern that allowing extensive discovery to taxpayers would create
attendant long delays and thus frustrate the legitimate actions of the IRS was
the rationale underlying these restrictions.99 Thus, in order to be allowed
discovery, a taxpayer resisting enforcement of a summons is required to go
beyond a mere allegation that the purpose for the summons was improper
and instead must offer proof that enforcement would be an abuse of the
court's process.' 0
0
95. United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1967).
96. United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1973) (government met its bur-
den of showing good cause to overcome work-product privilege by expressing a good faith belief
that the document summoned was necessary for a correct determination of the taxpayer's tax
liabilities and that the information contained therein could be obtained from no other source).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) authorizes the use of the discovery procedures contained
therein. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 n.18 (1964); United States v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., 520 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Moriarty, 278 F.Supp.
187, 189 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F.Supp. 190, 192 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
98. The district courts have discretion under FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) to restrict discovery.
See, e.g., United States v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d
40, 42 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1969). Discovery
is usually limited for policy reasons, United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681
(1958); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512
(1947).
99. See United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v.
Troupe, 317 F. Supp. 416, 422 (W.D. Mo. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971).
100. In United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1970), the court established a
procedure to be followed in granting discovery. It ruled that if a taxpayer offered some support
of its allegations, the district court should conduct a hearing at which the summonee could
examine the agent concerning his purpose in issuing the summons. The court could then make
a determination on whether further discovery was necessary to establish the validity of the
government's purpose.
This procedure has been endorsed and followed in other circuits. See United States v.
Church of Scientology of Cal., 520 F.2d 818, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (church's allegations of bad
faith harassment raised sufficient doubts about the purpose of the IRS to require a limited
evidentiary hearing to determine whether discovery was warranted); United States v. McCar-
thy, 514 F.2d 368, 376 (3d Cir. 1975) (allegations that enforcement of summons would result in
a second inspection or that the IRS already possessed the information sought were sufficient to
warrant evidentiary hearing); United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th
Cir. 1972) (mere allegations of improper purpose in issuance of summons were insufficient to
justify further discovery).
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The courts have applied a balancing test' 0 1 to determine whether, and to
what extent, discovery should be allowed. The taxpayer's difficulty in meet-
ing his burden of proving that the summons was improper is weighed against
the government's need for efficient tax collection. Obtaining discovery in a
summons enforcement proceeding has become almost as difficult' 0 2 as suc-
cessfully contesting an IRS summons.
In order to prove that the IRS, as an institution, has abandoned all intent
of pursuing a civil tax liability,103 a taxpayer would need to conduct exten-
sive discovery. This increased need for discovery could substantially alter the
balance 104 between the taxpayer and the IRS, and the courts accordingly
will be faced with a difficult choice. They may be compelled to reduce the
criminal prosecution defense to a meaningless remedy because of the tax-
payer's inability to gain access to the proof necessary to substantiate his
claim. If instead the courts choose to follow their traditional role of protector
of the interests of the taxpayer 10 5 in summons enforcement proceedings,
they may find themselves authorizing discovery which could seriously in-
fringe upon the government's interest in prompt and efficient tax collec-
tion. 106
An additional problem created by the LaSalle decision is the possibility
that the new standard will have a chilling effect on the exercise of the tax-
payer's right to contest a summons. The protection of taxpayers from over-
zealous special agents depends upon review of the agents' actions either by
101. United States v. Wright Motor Freight Co., 536 F.2d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1975).
102. For further discussion of the discovery process in these cases, see Stroud, The Criminal
Prosecution Defense: A Defense to a 7602 Summons? 4 AM. J. CRiM. L. 152, 176-78 (1976);
Comment, Constraints on the Administrative Summons Power of the Internal Revenue Service,
63 IOWA L. REV. 526, 537-39 (1977).
103. 437 U.S. at 316.
104. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
105. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S.
440, 446 (1964).
106. One lower court has already dealt with the problem of discovery under the LaSalle
standard. In United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 585 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978), taxpayers
alleged that a summons was issued in bad faith because the IRS had already recommended
criminal prosecution to the Regional Counsel's office. The taxpayers contended that under
LaSalle a taxpayer's opposition to a summons should not be determined solely on the basis of
affidavits, arguing that this determination may be made only after "reasonable discovery and an
evidentiary hearing."
The taxpayers' allegation of bad faith was supported by a letter from the Regional Counsel to
the taxpayers' attorney. The letter stated that a recommendation for criminal prosecution had
begun to be processed through the IRS, but there was no indication as to what internal level
that recommendation had reached at the time of issuance of the summons. See 437 U.S. at
313-16 for a description of the layers of review through which such a recommendaion must pass.
The Marine Midland court concluded that this information sufficiently raised the issue of bad
faith to require more information, but that only disclosure by IRS affidavit was necessary. It
stated that "[n]o full-dress discovery and trial would seem necessary here, since the issue in this
case is only whether the IRS 'in an institutional sense had abandoned its pursuit of. .. civil tax
liability'." 585 F.2d 36, 39, citing 98 S. Ct. at 2368, reported in 437 U.S. at 318.
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their superiors or by the courts. By making it more difficult to effectively
challenge an internal revenue summons, the Supreme Court has increased
the likelihood that taxpayers will not exercise their right to make this chal-
lenge. Consequently, neither review will take place. 10 7
CONCLUSION
In United States v. LaSalle National Bank, the Supreme Court attempted
to clarify a standard which has been troubling the courts for many years. If it
had affirmed the lower court's holding that a summons is unenforceable if
the sole purpose of the special agent conducting the investigation is to obtain
evidence of criminal tax liability, the Court would have protected the in-
terests and rights of taxpayers. If instead the Court had accepted the gov-
ernment's position and held that any summons issued before a recommenda-
tion for criminal prosecution has been made to the Department of Justice is
enforceable, it would have provided a clear, objective standard for the lower
courts to follow. By attempting to arrive at a compromise between the two
positions, however, the Court has created a standard that may prove to be
both unrealistic and unworkable. In practice, the institutional good faith
standard established in LaSalle will probably provide no greater protection
to the taxpayer than the one-step objective test advocated by the govern-
ment. Therefore, the Court would have been wiser to have adopted the
objective test.10 8 Although that standard would not afford much protection
to the taxpayer, it would at least lessen the difficulties the lower courts are
likely to experience in attempting to adhere to the new standard.
Nancy Graber
107. The inherent danger that improper summonses may be complied with before they have
been reviewed was recognized some years ago in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 219 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy stated there that:
It is no answer that the individual may refuse to produce the material demanded.
Many persons have yielded solely because of the air of authority with which the
demand is made, a demand that cannot be enforced without subsequent judicial
aid. Many invasions of private rights thus occur without the restraining hand of the
judiciary ever intervening.
108. In United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 585 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978), the court
criticized the LaSalle decision for not adopting the objective standard for resolving the good
faith inquiry. It described LaSalle as "leav[ing] the door open to a taxpayer (although perhaps
only slightly) even if there has been no recommendation to the Justice Department." Id. at 38.

